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This paper develops a life cycle model for agricultural households in which social 
capital is a fixed input into household production.  The intertemporal solutions of the 
model yield four results that are consistent with recent empirical and qualitative 
literature on social capital and consumption among agricultural households: commodity 
consumption will rise for an agricultural household in a village in which public social 
capital is increasing – even if the household itself has invested little in their own 
accumulation of social relations; increased inequality within villages is associated with 
lower social capital; public social capital will decrease significantly in the presence of 
migration of young from rural communities; and current consumption levels will be less 
sensitive to increases in income uncertainty when social capital is increasing.  The paper 
uses information on agricultural households in Tanzania to illustrate the model. 
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Social Capital and Consumption among Agricultural Households  
 
Recent empirical evidence has shown that the presence of active local 
organizations is a large and significant determinant of consumption among agricultural 
households in Tanzania (Narayan and Pritchett 1999) and Indonesia (Grootaert 1999).  
This paper develops a life cycle model of household production in which accumulated 
social relations in local organizations increases commodity consumption.  The model is 
based on the hypothesis that utility-maximizing agricultural households simultaneously 
make allocation decisions about current consumption, expenditures on education, and 
social relations in local organizations: these decisions are modeled as household 
production of commodities, investments in one form of human capital, and investments 
one form of social capital, “the set of elements of the social structure that affects relations 
among people and are inputs or arguments of the production and/or utility function” 
(Schiff 1992).  Specifically, both household and village-wide social relations in local 
organizations are modeled as fixed inputs into household production. 
The intertemporal solutions of the model yield four results that are consistent with 
recent empirical and qualitative literature on social capital and consumption among 
agricultural households: commodity consumption will rise for an agricultural household  2 
in a village in which public social capital is increasing – even if the household itself has 
invested little in their own accumulation of social relations; increased inequality within 
villages is associated with lower social capital; public social capital will decrease 
significantly in the presence of migration of young from rural communities; and current 
consumption levels will be less sensitive to increases in income uncertainty when social 
capital is increasing.   
  This paper is organized as follows.  Section I provides an overview of social 
relations and social capital.  Section II presents an applicable set of definitions and a 
discussion of how the model applies to rural Tanzania.  Section III presents the set-up and 
assumptions of the model.  Section IV presents the intertemporal solutions of the model.  
Section V concludes with a discussion of the policy implications of the model. 
 
I. Social Relations, Organizations, and Social Capital 
  It is easily argued that social relations do not belong in an economic framework:  
nevertheless, an interdisciplinary set of scholars has made progress in integrating social 
behavior into a rational-choice perspective.
1  Anthropological analyses of human 
behavior show how dyadic interactions evolve into networks of social interaction and 
reciprocity (Arensberg 1972).  Based on this tradition, Polanyi introduced the concept of 
‘embeddedness’ of economic behavior within social structures (e.g., Polanyi, Arensberg 
and Pearson 1957). In an influential refinement of this concept, Granovetter (1985) 
rejected sociological and anthropological frameworks in which social relations become 
‘epiphenomena’ of the market as well as the neoclassical economics framework in which 
social relations are absent: he argued that economic action is embedded in ongoing  3 
structures of social relations and that networks of personal interactions “generate trust and 
discourage malfeasance.”  In response, Platteau (1994a,b) contended that more than 
ongoing social relations are required for the growth of trust in market societies.  His 
detailed thesis--encompassing a thorough review of game-theoretic literature on the 
origins and maintenance of cooperation (Axelrod 1984, Sugden 1986) and examples from 
economic history (Greif 1994)--is that a generalized morality, based on “norms and 
cultural beliefs that are rooted in historical processes” (1994a), is a necessary component 
for the generation of trust and economic development.  ‘New Institutional’ economists 
have also explored the interaction between social and economic processes at the village 
(Bardhan 1993), firm (Williamson 1975), and national level (North 1990, Nugent 1993).    
  Recent work on social capital has focused on integrating social relations into an 
economic framework
2.  Coleman (1988, 1990) formally introduced the concept (“Social 
capital is defined by its function.  It is not a single entity, but a variety of different entities 
having two characteristics in common.  They all consist of some aspect of a social 
structure, and they facilitate certain actions of individuals who are within the structure.”) 
and explored the role of social capital in educational attainment.  In his influential study 
of the economic development of the twenty administrative regions of Italy, Putnam 
(1993) defined social capital as “features of social organization, such as trust, norms and 
networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions.”  
He found remarkable empirical and case study evidence of the long-lasting role of 
community organizations in development.  Becker, who in a well-known paper used the 
household production framework to analyze social interactions such as relations within 
families and contributions to charity (1974)
3, embraced the concept of social capital in an  4 
omnibus series of essays (Becker 1996).  He defines social capital as “influence of others 
on a person’s utility” and sketches an accumulation process for social capital that is 
similar to that of human capital.   
  How can one incorporate accumulated social relations in local organizations -- a 
form of social capital -- into a utility-maximizing framework among agricultural 
households?  Figure 1 depicts the standard neoclassical set up, where four households in a 
village have access to physical capital--both private and public--and to human capital.  In 
the figure, private physical capital is depicted within the rectangles around each 
household, public physical capital is depicted within the larger rectangle around 
households 3 and 4, and human capital is depicted in each circle.  If each of these capitals 
can be properly measured, it is relatively straightforward to incorporate them into a 
system of constrained utility maximization.  In a dynamic system, part of the 
maximization process involves foregoing current consumption for investments in the 
accumulation of private physical and human capital that will in turn be inputs into 
household production in the future. 
  Figure 2 illustrates the concept of embedding utility-maximizing behavior in a 
dynamic social structure.  Between pairs of nodes are selected sets of line segments that 
depict the dynamic accumulation through time of social relations between households 
with a common interest.  For example, households 1 and 2 belong to a rotating saving and 
credit associations (ROSCA); households 1, 3, and 4 belong to a farmers’ group.  To 
paraphrase Coleman, while human capital inheres in the nodes of this Figure (that is, in 
each household) social capital inheres in the connections between the nodes: the 
accumulation of social relations among households.  Note that their may be a private form  5 
of social capital--household 2 benefits only from accumulated social relations with 
household 1--and a public form--all households in the village benefit from all 
accumulated social relations
4.       
  Thus, as illustrated by the comparison between these two figures, efforts to 
incorporate social relations into an economic framework recognize an important set of 
real assets: the accumulation of social relations among households that (as explored 
below) may help to smooth consumption, resolve collective action dilemmas, reduce 
transactions costs, and diffuse knowledge, thereby increasing household utility. 
Consider how such a view of social capital accumulation can be applied to 
agricultural households in Tanzania.  First, household production of commodities is an 
appropriate framework for agricultural households in which family members must make 
decisions about household and agricultural labor allocations  (Deaton and Muellbauer 
1980; Singh, Squire and Strauss 1986).  In rural Tanzania, the typical household has 
about five family members, with adults employed in own holding agriculture (65% of 
total labor input), communal farming (24%) and non-farm activities (9%)  (Collier, 
Radwan and Wangwe 1986).  In many regions, variable rainfall considerably affects crop 
production (Dercon 1996), and one means of consumption smoothing for individual 
households is farming communal land for drought-resistant crops (Quinn 1995).  The 
primary asset for wealth accumulation is livestock (Dercon 1996), while opportunities 
and demand for adult education have historically been greater than in surrounding 
countries (Putterman 1994).     
  Local organizations play a prominent and productive role among agricultural 
households in Tanzania.  Based on surveys of 600 households in twenty villages in eight  6 
regions, Collier, Radwan and Wangwe (1986) found that households which attended 
village assemblies and cooperative meetings had income that were 43 percent and 20 
percent higher, respectively, than those who did not.  Data from field work among 
households and farmers’ associations in two regions supports the hypothesis that 
membership in member-controlled participatory groups has a significant positive effect 
on farmers’ market orientation and labor efficiency (DeTray 1995).  Data from field work 
among households and local organizations in two regions shows that social obligations in 
groups lead individuals to share wealth (and to understate income levels in the presence 
of poorer friends) and that the lack of differential risk-bearing ability hampers group 
formation (Nagpal 1994).  Narayan and Pritchett (1997) find that a measurement of public 
social capital based on the characteristics of local organizations has a large and 
statistically significant effect on per capita expenditures.  They also find that villages with 
high levels of public social capital have better publicly provided services, more active 
community activity on roads, and greater use of credit in agriculture.  Isham (2000) finds 
that that ethnically-based and participatory social affiliations act as a form of social 
capital in the decision to adopt improved fertilizer.   
 
II.  Definitions  
  The starting point for developing a model of household production that 
incorporates social capital is the fact that utility-maximizing households in rural villages, 
in addition to producing household commodities and investing in education, transact with 
others in social relations.  7 
Definition 1: Social relations are voluntary exchanges of resources with 
some level of generalized reciprocity.  
 
  Less formally, social relations are non-contractual exchanges between households 
in which resources change hands, with the understanding that additional exchanges are 
likely in the future.  Resources here include not only goods and services, but also other 
less tangible resources that can be controlled by one household and transferred to another: 
these include information, personal contacts, and social approval
5.  For example, among 
rural households, giving food and water to a household visitor (goods) and allowing a 
neighbor’s child to play in the family compound (services) are both examples of social 
relations.  But so too are telling another farmer about an improved hybrid seed 
(information), introducing a new high-school student to the school director (personal 
contacts), and participating in the burial ceremony of a village elder (social approval).  
Note that each of these actions is voluntarily chosen by the (head of the) household, 
requires market-purchased goods and/or time, and contains an element of generalized 
reciprocity. 
  It is useful to classify collections of these relations as bounded sets among 
selected groups of households. 
Definition 2:  A bounded set of social relations is a set of recurring social 
relations among two or more households with a mutual interest. 
 
  The boundary of such a set is determined by an identifiable mutual interest: of a 
group of N households in a community, for example, a subset N* may form a bounded set 
of social relations based on their interest in educating their young children
6. 
      One of the most important types of bounded sets of social relations in rural 
villages is the local organization
7.   8 
Definition 3: A local organization is a bounded set of social relations in 
which membership entails payment of dues or the contribution of goods 
and services.  
 
  Local organizations have a well-defined list of members
8: the selection process for 
organizations may be determined by the active choice of the current members or by some 
internal rule. Because of their common interest of educating their children, many parents 
of school-age children in a rural village will join the Parent’s Association at the local 
school.  Note that this definition is consistent with two types of mutual interests: 
explicitly economic (for example, a ROSCA or a water and sanitation users groups) and 
non-economic (for example, a religious or cultural group)
9. 
  Finally, this collection of definitions yields a definition of a social structure.  
Definition 4: A social structure is a set of bounded sets of social relations 
within an arbitrary but well-defined region. 
 
  Thus, a village’s social structure is the set of bounded sets of social relations, 
including local organizations, within its borders
10. 
  Social relations in local organizations are the form of social capital in this model, 
following the general definition of Schiff (1992).  He defines social capital as, “the set of 
elements of the social structure that affects relations among people and are inputs or 
arguments of the production and/or utility function.”  In the model developed in the next 
two section, social relations within local organizations are fixed inputs into household 
production functions. 
 
III.  Set-up and Assumptions of the Model  9 
  Based on the definitions in the attached proposal and the multi-period household 
production model of Ghez and Becker (1975), this model begins with three assumptions.  
Each household includes a head whose known lifetime, T, defines the life cycle.  The 
head and other household members have an aggregate utility function.  Life cycle utility 
over an aggregate household commodity (Ct) is additively separable
11: 
  U =  Σβ  
tv(Ct,Ω t)
12.       ( 1 )  
where β  is the discount factor
13, t is the age of household head, v(.) is the individual 
period subutility function, and Ω t
 are “variables that affect the desirability of consumption 
at different points in the life cycle, household demographic structure being perhaps the 
most obvious” (Deaton 1992). 
  To maximize life cycle utility, each household i in village j allocates time and 
market goods for three production activities
14: (a) household production of commodities  
(with time and goods inputs of Lt and Xt respectively); (b) accumulation of human capital 
(Ht) through production of education (with time and goods inputs of Nt
h and Xt
h), and (c) 
accumulation of social capital (St) through social relations in local organizations (with 
time and goods inputs of Nt
s and Xt
s).  Each household must also allocate time for: (d) 
income generation (time inputs of Nt). 
  (a)  Household production of commodities is defined by: 
  Ct = Ψ tF(Xt, Lt).    t = 1,2, ....... T    (2) 
where F(.) is twice differentiable and homogenous of the first degree.  Ψ t is an index that 
aggregates all fixed inputs into household production:  10 
  4 3 2 1
0
φ φ φ φ ψ ψ
t t j j S K S K t=       ( 3 )  
where Ψ 0 is a constant; Kj and Sj are public physical and social capital in village j at time 
t; Kt is physical capital of household i in village j at age of the household head t; and the 
φ ‘s are the respective efficiency parameters
15.   
  What is the role of each of these fixed inputs?  In rural villages of the developing 
world, private physical capital includes durable goods such as automobiles, bicycles, and 
household appliances; public physical capital includes feeder roads, health clinics, and 
water and sanitation facilities.  More of each of these fixed inputs reduces the amount of 
consumption goods and time required to achieve a given level of commodities
16.  In order 
to focus on human and social capital, the dynamics here are simplified by assuming that 
both of these inputs are given: each village has a fixed amount of public physical capital; 
and each household starts with a fixed amount of durable goods and makes no subsequent 
investments in private physical capital
17. 
  Private social capital includes accumulated social relations by household i in local 
organizations to which it belongs; public social capital includes the accumulated social 
relations among all households in village j.  What justifies modeling private and public 
social capital as fixed inputs into household production?  How do they reduce the amount 
of consumption goods and time required to achieve a given level of commodities?  As 
discussed above, accumulated social relations of each household can yield a flow of 
goods and services, information, personal contacts, and social approval
18.  This view of 
personal social capital accumulation is consistent with the rational-choice perspective of 
Coleman (1990) and the economic embeddedness thesis of Granovetter (1985), in which  11 
each household’s social relations “generate trust and discourage malfeasance” with 
reciprocating households. 
  Streeten (forthcoming) distinguishes among five different aspects of social capital 
and social investment (additions to the stock of capital): non-durable consumption goods; 
non-durable production goods; durable capital goods; durable investment goods for non-
marketed activities; and durable consumption goods.  The form of social capital that is 
modeled here corresponds to the fourth and fifth classification – and thereby does not 
explore the inherent (as opposed to instrumental) value of many kinds of social relations. 
Likewise, village-wide accumulated social relations can lower collective action 
dilemmas, reduce transactions costs, and diffuse information
19.  All households in 
villages with high levels of these characteristics would require less consumption goods 
and time to achieve a given level of commodities.  This view of public social capital is 
consistent with approaches of Putnam (1993) and Platteau (1994a,b), in which social 
relations produce civic networks and generalized reciprocity among all households in a 
region. 
  (b)  Human capital accumulation is defined by: 
  Ht+1 = [1-d
h] Ht + ht,       ( 4 )  
  ht = aij
h h(Xt
h, Nt
h),        ( 5 )  
where d
h is the depreciation rate on human capital; ht is the amount of human capital 
generated in period t; aij
h is a productivity index associated with characteristics of the 
human capital accumulation process available to household i (for example, proximity of 
schools); and h(.) is the production function for increments of human capital, which is 
concave in both arguments.  12 
  (c)  Social capital accumulation is modeled in a similar fashion:  
  St+1 = [1- d
s] St + st,       ( 6 )  
  st = aij
s s(Xt
s, Nt
s)        ( 7 )  
where d
s  is the depreciation rate on social capital; st is the amount of social capital 
generated in local organizations in period t; aij
s is a productivity index associated with 
characteristics of the social capital accumulation process available to household i (for 
example, membership composition of local organizations); and s(.) is the production 
function for increments of social capital, which is concave in both arguments.   
  Less formally, this form of social capital is accumulated each period through 
social relations with other households in local organizations: the amount of goods and 
time allocated by each household to these social relations, along with selected 
characteristics of these organizations, determine the amount of social capital generated 
per period.  As further discussed below, each household takes as fixed the amount of Sj,: 
it does not take into account the effect of its own social relations on the accumulation of 
public social capital.     
  There are advantages and disadvantages to modeling social capital accumulation 
like human capital accumulation.  Allocation decisions about social relations can be 
readily integrated into an established life-cycle model of household production
20; in 
addition, social capital of this form can be measured with selected data on local 
organizations (Narayan and Pritchett 1999, Grootaert 1999, and Isham and Kähkönen 
2000).  However, this modeling does impose a relatively simple form on a complex 
aspect of human behavior.  13 
  (d)  Income generation per period (eijtHtNt) is a product of a random efficiency 
parameter eijt for household i in village j; the current level of human capital; and time 
allocated for income generation. Each household in period t knows eijt, but all future 
observations are unknown
21.  This is the source of uncertainty in the model: it captures 
the idiosyncratic shocks that affect real incomes of agricultural households, including 
those resulting from variability of local weather conditions
22. 
  Finally, life cycle maximization is constrained by limits on time availability in 
each period (θ ) and by the intertemporal accumulation of assets:   
  Lt + Nt + Nt
h + Nt
s = θ     t = 1,2, ..., T    (8) 




s],   (9) 
where At are assets at age t; r is the constant rate of interest; and  pt, pt
h, and pt
s are the 
respective price indices for goods used in household production, production of human 
capital, and production of social capital.  Thus, each household begins each period t with 
assets of [1+r]At-1: after the realization of eijt, the household then allocates goods and time 
to produce household commodities, human capital, and social capital and time to earn 
income, finishing the period with assets of At. 
 
IV.  Derivation and implications of intertemporal solutions. 
  As shown in Deaton (1992) with a single state variable, dynamic programming 
effectively yields solutions of a life cycle model.  Here I use this procedure with three 
state variables: assets, human capital, and social capital. 
  This procedure begins with a Bellman’s equation defined over a value function:  14 
  V(At, Ht, St) = v(Ct, Zt) + β  Et V(At+1, Ht+1, St+1),    (10) 
where E is the expectations operator.  In any period t, the maximized value function 
equals the maximized value of the two terms on the right hand side: utility in the same 
period and the discounted expected value of the state variables in the next period. 





after substituting the expressions for household production (2 and 3); time constraints (8); 
asset accumulation (9); human capital accumulation (4 and 5); and social capital 
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where all partial derivatives of the value function are expressed with a sub-script 
(e.g.,Va(.)).  The second expression in (11) defines π t as the marginal cost of current 
consumption.  Intuitively, this is the product of the price of an input (the opportunity cost 
of time and the price of the good, respectively) and the amount of the input required to 
produce a marginal amount of the commodity.  Comparable expression in (12) and (13) 
are similarly defined: π t
h  and  π t
s are the marginal costs of human capital and social 
capital, respectively, generated in period t.  
From (11), the marginal utility of consumption equals the expected marginal value 
of commodity inputs carried over as assets. From (12) and (13), the expected marginal 
value of each form of capital equals the expected value of commodity inputs carried over 
as assets.    
All intertemporal trade-offs can be expressed in terms of the basic elements of the 
model by substituting out the value function.  Differentiating (10) with respect to At by 
the envelope theorem yields: 
VA At Ht St EtVA At Ht St r (,,) ( , , ) [ ] = ++ + + β 11 1 1 .   (14) 
Substituting (14) into (11), shifting forward one period, and substituting back into (11) 
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Differentiating (10) with respect to Ht by the envelope theorem yields (16):  16 
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Substituting from (12) and (14), shifting forward one period, rearranging, and substituting 
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Equation (15) captures the intertemporal trade off between consumption in two 
consecutive periods.  Equations (17) and (18) determine the expected time paths of assets, 
human capital, and social capital.   
  Based on the set-up and results of this model, how do public and private social 
capital affect consumption levels of utility-maximizing agricultural households?  First, as 
modeled here, each household takes as fixed the amount of Sj: it does not take into 
account the effect of its own social relations on the accumulation of public social capital.  
If Sj is an increasing function of the accumulated social capital of all households in 
village j, the social planner’s solution to this intertemporal maximization would include 
an additional term in the numerator of (18), the marginal product of households i’s social  17 
capital in the next period as a fixed input into commodity production of all other 
households.   
The presence of this production externality raises two potentially important points 
about the accumulation of social capital in rural villages.  From (15), when the interest 
rate is greater than or equal to the discount rate and the marginal cost of commodity 
consumption is falling, commodity consumption will be rising.  When the price of 
consumption goods are unchanged, these conditions for marginal costs will be met when 
fixed inputs into household production are rising: that is, when levels of physical capital 
or social capital are increasing.
23  Ceteris paribus, commodity consumption will rise for 
an agricultural household in a village in which public social capital is increasing – even if 
the household itself has invested little in their own accumulation of social relations.  This 
result is consistent with the empirical findings of Narayan and Pritchett (1999) and 
Grootaert (1999): greater consumption levels among agricultural households in villages 
with higher public social capital in Tanzania and Indonesia, respectively. 
In addition, as income increases for some households (because of either increases 
of private human capital or an upward exogenous shift of the efficiency parameter eijt), 
these households may substitute away from social relations – because the technology for 
the generation of social capital in (7) is likely to be time-intensive, and the opportunity 
cost of time increases with greater incomes.  Since this substitution would lead to lower 
levels of public social capital, it opens the possibility of increased inequality (in terms of 
household production of commodities) within villages: one set of households would 
increase commodity consumption through higher incomes, while another set would have 
less commodity consumption as productive stocks of public social capital decrease.  This  18 
result is consistent with the empirical findings of La Ferrara (1998): higher inequality is 
associated with lower levels of social capital in Tanzania. 
From (18), the return of assets equals the expected return of social capital: the 
sum of the value of the marginal product of social capital in the next period and the 
marginal cost of producing the same amount of social capital (net of depreciation) in the 
next period, divided by the marginal cost.  The second term in the numerator captures the 
value of the carried over social capital stock in all subsequent periods: this implies that, 
ceteris paribus, social capital accumulation will be greater during the early stages of the 
household’s life cycle.
24  This is consistent with the observation (Schiff 1992) that public 
social capital will decrease significantly in the presence of migration of young from rural 
communities.  
Finally, what does this model imply regarding risk–averse behavior among 
agricultural households?  As discussed by Deaton (1992, 1994), intertemporal optimality 
conditions such as those derived above offer guidance on behavior among risk-averse 
rural households that face different levels of uncertainty.  Consider a household in village 
j that faces greater uncertainty (in terms of a mean preserving spread around eijt) than 
another household in village j.  Where the marginal utility of consumption is decreasing 
and convex, the increase in spread will increase the expected future value of marginal 
utility: in order to preserve the equality in (14), savings will increase and current 
consumption will fall
25.  Accordingly, when private and public social capital are rising -- 
thereby accelerating the consumption path – current consumption levels will be less 
sensitive to increases in income uncertainty: ceteris paribus, the expected future value of 
marginal utility will be falling with increases of social capital.       19 
 
V.  Policy implications of the Model 
This paper has developed and solved a dynamic model of household production 
that incorporates social capital.  The paper’s main results are to illustrate how the 
presence of active local organizations can affect the consumption levels of utility-
maximizing agricultural households.  The empirical results which are consistent with this 
paper (Narayan and Pritchett 1999; Grootaert 1999; La Ferrara 1998) as well as other 
recent empirical work on development outcomes and social capital (Isham and Kähkönen 
2000, forthcoming; Grootaert et. al. forthcoming) imply that policy makers can not ignore 
the composition of local social structures when designing projects to improve well-being 
among agricultural households in the developing world. 
Policy makers are increasingly investing in social capital by supporting local 
organizations comprised of agricultural households (Narayan 2000; Bebbington, 
Guggenheim, and Woolcock forthcoming).  For example, FAO’s ‘Special Programme for 
Food Security’ in the Dodoma and Morogoro regions of Tanzania helped to form 78 
participatory farmers’ groups which pooled the resources of 1116 farmers into a ROSCA, 
thereby improving their negotiation position towards input suppliers and traders (FAO 
2000).   
The results of this paper give guidelines for the consideration of such investments.  
In particular, because of their external effects, potential investments in social capital 
should be considered alongside potential investments in physical and human capital 
during the planning of most development projects.  Using this household production 
framework leads to the conclusion that only in some cases will investments in social  20 
capital be called for -- depending, among other criteria, on the relative values of the 
parameters φ 1 and φ 2).  Based on this model, a policy maker that is trying to maximize the 
utility of a representative agricultural household should allocate resources to physical and 
social capital until their respective marginal rates of substitution are equal.  And even 
where investments in social capital may not be called for, the potential effect of social 
capital on a proposed development project should be assessed in the first phase of 
planning of most projects -- since social capital may be a complement (or a substitute) to 
other fixed inputs that affect well being.   
Assessing the composition and effects of local social capital can be achieved with 
social assessments, “systematic investigations of the social processes and factors that 
affect development impact and results”(World Bank 1996).  Since the early 1990s, they 
have been used in a wide range of development initiatives to identify key local 
stakeholders; to assure that social differences are taken into account in the design of 
development projects; and to assure that social differences do not limit service delivery 
(McPhail and Jacobs 1995a).  Social assessments are relatively inexpensive: the average 
cost of social assessments in 42 reviewed development projects was less than $100,000 
(McPhail and Jacobs 1995b). 
In agricultural communities with growing inequality and increased migration of 
the young, the share of poor households may be rising -- as public social capital is 
deteriorating.  By using ‘social assessments’ and by considering the economic returns to 
investments in a range of agricultural villages, development practitioners may advocate, 
in selected cases, that projects undertake no activity at all in low social capital villages – 
unless guided by equity considerations.  Under such circumstances, policy makers may be  21 
required to increase, at the margin, their investments in public forms of capital that act as 
fixed inputs into household production of poor households – including investments in the 
organizational capacity of the poor (Narayan 2000).   
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1 Smelser and Swedberg (1994) provide an invaluable collection of essays on economic sociology, Baron 
and Hannan (1994) review the literature on the impact of economics on sociology, and Winship and Rosen 
(1988) edit a collection of pertinent essays on sociological and economic approaches to the analysis of 
social structure. 
2 How is social capital defined?  As noted above, I adopt the definition of Schiff (1992). According to a 
recent sampling, social capital is the “‘ties’ that are used to exchange information” between firms (Rauch 
1996), a country’s “social glue” (Helliwell 1996), and: “the shared knowledge, understandings, institutions, 
and patterns of behavior that a group of individuals brings to any activity”  (Ostrom 1994).  See Woolcock 
(1998) for a further discussion of definitions of the term based on an extensive literature search. 
3 Becker (1974) notes that social interactions “emphasized in the contemporary sociological and 
anthropological literature [were] considered the cornerstone of behavior by several prominent nineteenth-
century economists,” including Marshall and Pigou. 
4 The first form corresponds to the social capital explored by Coleman (1988, 1990) and Granovetter 
(1985), the second form to that of Putnam (1993) and Platteau (1994a,b).   
5 This discussion of resources is partially based on Coleman (1990), particularly chapter 2, and Blau (1986).  
Including less tangible resources within this definition undoubtedly stretches the bounds of ‘economic’ 
analysis.  See Olson (1993) for an exploration of the place of non-market exchanges in economics and other 
social sciences.  
6 See Coleman (1990) for a discussion of closed networks, another important form of bounded sets of social 
relations in rural villages.  With perfect information, once could identify M bounded sets of social relations 
within a village, and then identify each of the households that belongs to each set. 
7 Esman and Uphoff (1984), Nugent (1993), Ostrom (1990). 
8 North (1990) defines organizations as “groups of individuals bound by some common purpose to achieve 
objectives” and notes that it is always clear who is a member. 
9 Esman and Uphoff (1984) provide a detailed classification of types of local organizations found in the 
developing world. 
10 The term “social structure” has many definitions within the different traditions in sociology.  Blau (1975) 
offers a helpful introduction: he notes that one tradition (e.g., of Talcott Parsons) is based on extant social 
systems, while a second (e.g., of Coleman) is based on individual behavior.  The second tradition is 
consistent with the definition presented here. 
11 Leisure is assumed to be an element in the aggregate household commodity.  With the simplifying 
assumption of additively separable utility (as discussed in Ghez and Becker (1975) and Deaton (1992)), the 
marginal rate of substitution between consumption of commodities in any two periods is unaffected by 
consumption in any other period.  
12 The symbol Σ  without sub- and super-scripts implies the summation from t=1 to T.     
13 And β  = [1+δ ]
-1, where δ  is the discount rate. 
14 For notational simplicity, the subscripts i and j are subsumed here. 
15 Using this form, the four capital inputs are complements.  In addition, Hicks neutrality as used here 
implies that the ratio of marginal products of consumption goods and time is constant, and factor shares are 
unchanged.  Using Harrod neutrality could allow for relatively higher marginal productivity of consumption 
time with higher levels of private social capital. 
16 Betancourt (1996) showed that public goods could be viewed as fixed inputs into household production 
functions of consumers. Gleason (1996) tested the effects of health care services on child survival using this 
approach, based on the model of distribution services developed by Betancourt and Gautschi (1992).   
17 The latter assumption is consistent with a inter-generation life cycle framework where the final period 
assets of one household are endowed as consumer durables for the first period of a household in the next 
generation.  29 
                                                                                                                                                 
18 Note that it is accumulated social relations within local organizations, not economic benefits produced by 
these organizations that yield this flow.  To preserve the focus on accumulated social relations (as opposed 
to the provision of collective goods, as in Olson (1965), Hardin (1982), and Sandler (1992)), the outputs of 
economic local organizations (e.g., water and sanitation user associations) are omitted here. 
19 In a comment on a paper by Oliver Williamson, Robert Putnam delineated four means by which 
“networks of civic engagement” reduce transactions costs and increase the flow of information: (i) reduce 
the attractions of opportunism; (ii) foster robust norms of generalized reciprocity and social trust; (iii) 
amplifying the flow of information and transmitting reputations; and (iv) providing templates for future 
collaborations (Putnam 1995). 
20 The approach here is similar to that of Becker (1996), which includes a human capital accumulation 











t, “where d is the depreciation rate on social capital and X (= Σ  x
j) is the effect of choices by the j 
members of i’s network on his social capital.”  The model here is fully consistent with the ideas explored in 
his essay, while narrowing the focus to social capital accumulation through social relations in local 
organizations. 
21 The size and quality of land holding is notably omitted from the underlying model here.  According to 
Collier, Radwan and Wangwe (1986), “in most of Tanzania land is abundant, so that its distribution is 
determined mostly by the availability of household labor.” 
22 In the previous draft of this paper, this parameter was defined for villages, so that all households in 
village j would be exposed to the identical shock.  But according to Townsend’s review of the literature of 
consumption insurance and risk-bearing systems (Townsend 1995), recent work shows that households 
within agricultural villages tend to face idiosyncratic shocks.  Moreover, he finds little evidence in the 
literature that households diversify in their choice of income generation in order to mitigate risk. 








24 From (17), a similar conclusion can be reached about the accumulation of human capital. 
25 Deaton (1994) notes that in general “the convexity of marginal utility of consumption--which 
characterizes how prudent or cautious people are--is not the same thing as the concavity of the utility 
function--which characterizes the degree of risk aversion.” However, in the case of the standard isoelastic 
utility function (as adopted here), which implies a constant coefficient of relative risk aversion, consumers 
who are more risk averse are also more cautious.   